For many years, the Russian Federation has been conducting a multilayered hybrid influence campaign against the Baltic states.
Moscow relies on various instruments of “soft power”: from economic presence to cultural and sports-related projects. The Kremlin actively exploits the ideology of the “Russian world” and the narrative of “protecting compatriots abroad” in an attempt to justify interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries.
The information front plays a particularly important role in this hybrid strategy. Social networks have become a space of accelerated “militarisation”, where limited regulation and open borders enable the unchecked spread of disinformation and hate. This is facilitated by networks of fake accounts and so-called troll factories. One of the most notorious examples is the “Olgino bot farm” in St. Petersburg (the Internet Research Agency, previously supported by the late founder of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin).
Such organisations have for years disseminated pro-Kremlin disinformation and attempted to influence audiences across the internet — including within the Baltic states. Beyond the media sphere, the Kremlin uses economic levers and sport as additional tools of influence. Investments and business ties frequently serve as a means of exerting pressure on elites or circumventing sanctions. Sport, in turn, has become a battleground of soft power: not only through cases where Russian oligarchs purchase foreign sports clubs, but also through individuals whose activities, according to experts, reflect Moscow’s interests. In recent years, similar tendencies have been observed within the Lithuanian business environment.
A shadow figure of sports propaganda?
Recently, Lithuanian business magnate Gediminas Žemelis — often referred to as the richest man in Lithuania — has come under renewed public scrutiny. He controls Avia Solutions Group (ASG), an aviation holding comprising more than 100 companies across 68 countries. However, his activities have not been without controversy.
Lithuanian authorities have previously suspended several of Žemelis’ projects over concerns regarding potential links to Russian entities, including security services. During a hearing in the European Parliament in May 2021, Russian opposition figure Mikhail Khodorkovsky explicitly referred to “possible connections” between Avia Solutions Group and individuals from Vladimir Putin’s inner circle.
More recently, investigative journalists have focused on a young Lithuanian sports manager, Ovidijus Jurevičius. In February 2023, he became Marketing Director of Avia Solutions Group Arena and simultaneously oversaw marketing communications for the basketball club BC Wolves. Both entities are associated with Žemelis: the arena carried his company’s name, while the Wolves basketball team was created with his financial involvement.
In 2024, Jurevičius founded his own agency, MB Sportbiz, and launched the platform “Uncover by OJ”, presenting himself as a sports management consultant. His public biography appeared impeccable — no scandals, no questionable episodes. He also positioned himself as an ambitious professional: at the age of 29, he even ran for the position of director of the renowned football club FK Žalgiris (although he did not win the competition). Such a rapid rise made him a visible figure in Lithuania’s sports sector.
However, according to informed sources, this image may conceal certain details that could potentially be exploited by external actors. Acquaintances claim that Jurevičius has repeatedly spoken about a personal struggle — a long-term addiction to gambling. According to them, this problem originated in childhood, when his parents would take him to betting shops, normalising gambling from an early age.
Another noteworthy detail, sources say, is that Jurevičius’ father holds openly pro-Russian views. This could help explain why working in structures indirectly linked to Moscow may not have caused internal conflict for Jurevičius himself. Family background, observers suggest, may have played a role.
Inherited gambling addiction, personal ambition and limited resistance to pro-Russian influence, according to several experts, could make Jurevičius potentially vulnerable to recruitment attempts by Russian intelligence. Some analysts do not rule out that during his work on Žemelis-related projects he may have come into the sight of Russian operatives.
One scenario suggests that Jurevičius could be positioned as an executor of informational tasks for the Kremlin within Lithuania’s sports ecosystem. His professional sphere is highly conducive to the discreet introduction of pro-Kremlin narratives or network influence targeting sports communities and younger audiences.
Today, Ovidijus Jurevičius presents himself as a successful entrepreneur and sports marketing expert. However, the presence of pro-Russian elements in his environment and certain personal circumstances raise concerns. Individuals of this type often become what analysts call “information reserves” — figures who do not attract suspicion for long periods thanks to a carefully cultivated reputation.
The case of Jurevičius illustrates just one fragment of a broader pattern of Russian hybrid influence in Lithuania and the Baltic region. Moscow continues to seek pathways to embed itself in business, sport and media spheres. Lithuanian intelligence agencies have repeatedly warned about such risks, noting that covert influence can pose a threat to national security — especially if actors aligned with Russian interests operate without scrutiny, gradually undermining institutional resilience.
Preventing this requires heightened vigilance from state institutions and society alike. Security and law-enforcement agencies must thoroughly investigate any suspicious connections with Russian entities and, where evidence exists, respond decisively. Ensuring transparency and resilience across Lithuania’s information, cultural and sports sectors is increasingly becoming a matter of national security.
At the same time, societal unity is essential — a clear distancing from “Russian world” narratives and values. In the face of a sophisticated hybrid offensive targeting the Baltics, the most effective response remains vigilance, civic cohesion and an unwavering commitment to strengthening national independence.