Faced with U.S. political turbulence and a resurgent Russian threat, Europe is being forced into strategic introspection. Grandiose declarations of autonomy ring hollow, however, as the continent’s defence apparatus still leans heavily on the U.S. Defence Industrial Base, and its own industrial limits are laid bare.
The European defence industry has been in somewhat of an existential crisis since the Russian invasion of Ukraine back in March 2022. The need for strategic autonomy has long been lauded in the halls of power in Berlin, Paris, Warsaw and Madrid, with a real desire for European defence capabilities to no longer be dependent on the vagaries of U.S. politics, or the limits imposed by U.S. arms export regulations. The constraints of U.S. export control regimes, particularly ITAR, are widely acknowledged as a serious obstacle.
Indeed, European defence continues to rely heavily on foreign imports, with statistics showing an increase in foreign defence spending from €3.1 billion for the period 2019–2021 to €7.9 billion for 2022–2024. Contrary to the bombastic rhetoric, many European countries remain deeply reliant on American weapons systems, procurement pipelines, and strategic guarantees.
The ambition of autonomy collides with industrial dependency
But Europe has been taking steps to tackle this issue. In March, the European Commission announced its ‘ReArmEurope Plan/Readiness 2030’, which promises to mobilise €800 billion to enable military spending in the European Union to reach 3.5% of GDP by the end of the decade (compared with 1.9% in 2024). The EU also launched its most ambitious defence industrial strategy to date — the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), adopted in March 2024, which called for a “war economy mode” and new joint procurement programs. The Commission has also put forward the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), designed to boost collaborative acquisition and support local manufacturing. Yet these initiatives, worth only a fraction of national procurement budgets, pale in comparison to the scale of European purchases from across the Atlantic.
A recent study by Brussels-based think tank Bruegel has outlined the shortfalls in these initiatives. European military capabilities remain underprepared for dealing with the multilateral threats it faces in today’s uncertain geopolitical climate. The continent remains highly dependent on the United States, notably for high-end, high-tech military equipment. According to Guntramm Wolff, Bruegel’s senior fellow, “Europe has the industrial production capacities to increase production of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. What is more concerning is the more modern weapons systems, where we have limited capabilities.” The report states that Europe’s ammunition and missile production is still insufficient to sustain long-term operations without U.S. backfill, even as European factories expand “at triple speed” according to the Financial Times.
A Goldman Sachs report found that 64% of European NATO defence procurement from 2020–24 came from the United States. In key domains, notably in fires, precision, and deep strike, Europe remains structurally dependant. Indeed, the war in Ukraine has revealed severe gaps in Europe’s defence capabilities, particularly in the field of Deep Precision Strikes. Ammunition stockpiles have been depleted at unprecedented rates, notably due to being sent to Ukraine, while high-value missile systems remain in short supply.
The dangers of such reliance were further illustrated during Israel’s confrontation with Iran earlier this year. Despite its advanced missile defence network, Israel rapidly exhausted interceptor stockpiles during sustained Iranian barrages. According to defence officials cited in regional press reporting, Israel had to pause offensive operations while waiting for emergency resupply from the United States. Operational dependence followed directly from industrial dependence; a sobering lesson for Europe.
The procurement dilemma
Yet the policy response has been contradictory. On the one hand, ELSA a collaborative initiative, was launched in July 2024 by France, Germany, Italy, and Poland, later joined by Sweden, and the UK. Their ambition is to jointly develop indigenous ground‑launched, long‑range conventional strike capabilities—including missiles with ranges from around 500 km up to potentially 1,000–2,000 km—to address Europe’s deep‑strike capability gap. On the other, several member states, including Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland, have chosen to acquire—or are primarily interested in—U.S. Tomahawk missiles instead of backing European systems like SCALP or Taurus, or waiting for MBDA Long-Range Cruise Missile (LCM) program now nearing maturity. In mid-July, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius even announced his country’s intention to acquire US Typhon long-range missile launch systems. Purchases from the United States may be justified as “interim solutions,” but they divert budgets from European programs and risk locking countries into long-term reliance, even as Brussels champions homegrown alternatives.
Which is why Spain’s recent decision to reject the F-35 in favour of European alternatives has been hailed as a real breakthrough and a strategic move that will reinforce European autonomy as transatlantic tensions continue to rise over NATO spending. “The Spanish option involves the current Eurofighter and the FCAS in the future,” the Spanish defence ministry told POLITICO. Other European countries, however, remain tied to the F-35 program, despite growing discontent with President Trump’s volatile tariff policy. “If you keep punching your allies in the face, eventually they’re going to stop wanting to buy weapons from you,” stated a Western European defence official, speaking anonymously to Politico. “Right now we have limited options outside of U.S. platforms, but in the long run? That could change in the coming decades if this combativeness keeps up.”
For advocates of sovereignty, any continued reliance on the United States is self-defeating. “Strengthening EU defence will not undermine NATO — it will reinforce it,” argued European Council President Charles Michel in the Financial Times. Industrial leaders agree. In a Time interview, Saab’s CEO Micael Johansson warned that Europe needs its own “golden dome” — an integrated missile defence system — or risk permanent vulnerability. Moreover, French Defence Minister Sébastien Lecornu has stated that “the war in Ukraine shows that long-range strikes are a key issue for the defense of Europe.” Paradoxically, Trump’s renewed skepticism of NATO has spurred a €150 billion surge in European defence commitments. But unless these funds flow into European programs, the result could be the opposite of autonomy: a reinforced dependency on U.S. industrial pipelines at the very moment leaders claim to be breaking free.
Decoupling for sovereignty
Industrial dependency persists, and the temptation of quick American solutions continues to trump long-term strategic logic. The result is a dangerous dissonance: leaders preaching sovereignty while signing contracts that reinforce vassalage. Until European governments align rhetoric with procurement and start backing domestic weapons systems, committing to FCAS and GCAP, and accelerating EDIS and ELSA, strategic autonomy will remain aspirational. The difficult weaning from the U.S. defence industrial base has only just begun, and for now, America still holds the bottle.